Creating and sharing knowledge to help end poverty www.manchester.ac.uk/bwpi Abstract Banerjee and Iyer (henceforth, BI) (American Economic Review, 2005) find that districts which the British assigned to landlord revenue systems systematically underperform districts with non-landlord based revenue systems, especially in agricultural investment and productivity and mainly after the onset of the Green Revolution in the mid-1960s. On this basis, BI claim there were long-lasting effects of the institutions established in British India on a variety of development outcomes after independence. We correct a miscoding of the land revenue system in Central Provinces, which BI characterise as mostly landlord based, when reliable historical evidence suggest that this region should have been attributed to a mixed landlord/non-landlord based revenue system. Using a more appropriate classification of the land revenue system of the Central Provinces constructed from documented archival research, we find no evidence that agricultural performance of Indian districts in the post-independence period was adversely affected by the colonial landlord land revenue system. Our results demonstrate that the key BI argument that the more 'oppressive' landlord-based colonial land revenue systems mattered for post-independent agricultural development in India rests on fragile historical and statistical foundations.
Introduction
In a prize-winning article published by the American Economic Review, Abhijit Banerjee and Lakshmi Iyer (2005) (BI from now on) attribute variation in agricultural performance, health, education and crime in postindependence India (up to about 1991) to variation in the land revenue institutions put in place during British colonial rule.
1 Their findings rate among the most compelling examples of how present development performance may be shaped and determined by institutions of the past, here dating back a century or more. Their paper contributes to the rapidly growing empirical literature addressing the persistent effects of colonial rule on contemporary economic performance (La Porta et al., 1998 , 1999 Acemoglu et al., 2001 Acemoglu et al., , 2002 Engerman and Sokoloff, 1997 ).
BI's main contention is that in areas of India where the colonial administration implemented land tax collection, either directly from cultivators (the so-called raiyatwari system), or was organised at the village level (the mahalwari system), subsequent agricultural and broader development has outperformed areas with so-called zamindari or malguzari settlements, which BI classify as landlord-systems. According to BI, the British colonial administration introduced policy changes that had the unintended consequence of placing different parts of India on dissimilar development trajectories with both immediate and latent, longterm effects. Remarkably, the most pronounced long-term impacts became apparent around 1965, or some two centuries after the East India Company acquired the first revenue collection rights in Bengal and Bihar. They show:
that districts in India where the collection of land revenue from the cultivators was assigned to a class of landlords systematically underperform the districts where this type of intermediation was avoided, after controlling for a wide range of geographical differences (BI: 1190).
In this paper, we revisit the empirical and historical foundations of BI's main findings and, in particular, their classification of the land revenue systems in British India into landlord and non-landlord categories, on which these findings crucially primarily rest. We argue that classification of the Central Provinces (comprising much of contemporary Madhya Pradesh, and parts of Maharashtra and Orissa) as a predominantly landlord revenue system by BI is mistaken, since reliable historical evidence (including the sources BI apparently use for coding the land revenue systems of districts in India) suggests that for the most part the malguzari settlement of the Central Provinces was very different from the Permanent (zamindari) settlement introduced in Eastern India by Cornwallis 70 years earlier (1793), and more closely resembled a village-based land revenue system (Baden-Powell 1892, volume 2, pp. 368-499) .
BI construct a continuous variable for the proportion of the area of a district under non-landlord land revenue settlement, with most districts in the Central Provinces classified as entirely landlord. They also test their hypothesis on the role of historical land revenue systems in determining post-independence agricultural development in India with a second variable, which is a dichotomous variable, by dividing districts into either landlord or non-landlord based revenue systems, again with the districts in the Central Provinces classified as landlord. We construct a new measure of non-landlord land in each of the districts in the former Central Provinces, derived from documented archival research, that takes into account the proportion of land area that is under landlord and non-landlord control (as we will argue later, under the malguzari settlement, most of the districts in the Central Provinces had parts of the land area under de facto landlord control and other parts that were characterised by non-landlord revenue systems). We also Following BI's account, in the landlord areas, 'the revenue liability for a village or a group of villages lay with a landlord (p1193)'. Further, 'the landlord was free to set the revenue terms for the peasants under his jurisdiction and to dispossess any peasant that did not pay the landlord what they owed him' (ibid). Further, and as a consequence, the landlord effectively had property rights in the land, and tenants had no security of tenure.
the land that were accompanied by a detailed record of rights, 'which served as the legal title to the land for the cultivator ' (ibid, p.1193 ).
In the mahalwari system, in the North-West Provinces (NWP) and Punjab, 'village bodies that jointly owned the village were responsible for land revenue ' (ibid, p.1194) .
In some areas it was a single person or family that made up the village body and hence was very much like the Bengal landlord (zamindari) system while in other areas the village body had a large number of members with each person being responsible for a fixed share of the revenue (ibid, p.1194).
BI track the debates addressing experiences with earlier settlements and suggest three explanations for why areas conquered at later dates were less likely to have a landlord system: the intellectual victories of two influential administrators, Munro and Mackenzie, the shifting perceptions among economists and others in Britain in response to the French Revolution and other international events, and finally, the perceived (mistaken) presence of landlords in areas to be settled (BI, pp. 1195-96) . BI describe Oudh, where the settlement was not permanent, but was often made with landlords (termed taluqdars), as the main setback to this increasingly progressive and enlightened colonial regime. When the Central Provinces were formally established as late as 1861-62, i.e. roughly a century after revenue rights had been secured for Bengal, Bihar and parts of Orissa and almost half a century after raiyatwari settlements were introduced in Bombay and most of Madras Presidency, it was also decided to have what was termed a landlord-based system there
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. Given the apparent increasing enlightenment of colonial administrators and the Mutiny of 1857, why should the British revert to adopting a revenue system that according to BI's interpretation most closely resembled the zamindari systems of Bihar and Bengal? We return to this issue below.
Empirical strategy
While BI presents a wide array of results on the possible effects of colonial land revenue systems on contemporary economic and social development in India, their main results and most striking findings relate to the effects of colonial land revenue systems on agricultural performance in the post-independence era. They show that districts where the British assigned proprietary rights in land to landlords (as they classify them) had significantly lower agricultural investments and productivity in the post-independence period than districts where rights were given to cultivators, either directly, or through village bodies; this effect is particularly pronounced after 1965, a date that not only marks the beginning of the Green Revolution, but also a period with extensive public investment in rural India. Their main explanatory variable is the extent of non-landlord control in a particular district (termed p_nland in their empirical analysis), while the key dependent variables are agricultural investment outcomes (the proportion of gross cropped area that was irrigated, quantity of fertilisers used per hectare of gross cropped area, the proportion of area sown with high-yielding varieties (HYV) of rice, wheat and other cereals), and agricultural productivity of rice, wheat and an index of 15 crops. BI use two alternative measures to capture the extent of landlord control in a district, a continuous variable defined on the [0,1] interval (p_nland, as stated above), which measures the proportion of the district under a raiyatwari/mahalwari revenue system and a simple binary dummy, landlord versus non-landlord land revenue systems, which is used in some regressions and in BI's map, reproduced as Figure 1 below. The areas classified as raiyatwari cover Bombay and most of Madras Presidencies, while the mahalwari system was found in the North-West Provinces (most of Uttar Pradesh minus Oudh) and Punjab. The areas coded as landlord, as seen in Figure 1 , are Bengal, Bihar and Chota Nagpore, Central Provinces, Orissa and the remainder of Madras Presidency.
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In their regression analyses, BI study agricultural performance using the India Agriculture and Climate Data Set collated by the World Bank and covering the period 1956-1987 with information on 271 districts, together with data based on original archival research and data production.
6 In their main regressions relating to agricultural performance, they use agricultural data for only 166 of these districts, which were mainly under British rule and for which information on land revenue systems were available. 7 BI's results, presented more fully in Section 4, show that non-landlord areas, on a variety of indicators of agricultural performance, including investment, the adoption of High Yielding Varieties and agricultural yields, significantly outperform landlord districts during the period 8 controlling for geographic 5 The origin of this map (Figure 1 in BI) is not provided. However, in an earlier version of this paper, Banerjee and Iyer provide a coloured map which has been clipped in such a way that the legend is not completely shown. This image is provided in the appendix as Figure A1 . The origin of this coloured image is not given, but we have traced it to BadenPowell, 1894. In this version it does not have the hatchings for revenue system types present in the Appendix Figure  A1 . This map does not allocate districts to revenue systems, but it bears a considerable resemblance to the map provided in Baden Powell (1892), a rather poor quality image of which is provided as Figure A2 in the appendix, which does provide such an allocation. A digitised copy of the BP 1892 map is provided below. 6 The World Bank data set could be downloaded at the date of writing from the source given in our appendix. It contains some errors and misclassifications which are carried over into the BI data set. We do not correct these in this paper to maintain maximum comparability with the BI data set. The sources for much of the rest of the BI data set are given in their web appendix, Table 3 (http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/0002828054825574), but are not exactly specified. We provide a limited discussion of the attribution of the data in our web appendix to this article (see Table A4 in Online Appendix variables such as latitude, altitude, soil type, mean annual rainfall, and a dummy for whether the district is on the coast or not. In addition, BI control for the length of time a district has been under British rule (using the date of British takeover), to account for the possibility that 'early British rule was particularly rapacious or because the best (or the worst) districts fell to the British first' (BI, p.1200). Their results suggest a strong and long dormant colonial overhang that extends to educational and health performance indicators. BI's main results survive a series of robustness tests (also discussed in Section 4).
What explains why non-landlord districts do better than landlord districts in India, especially after the onset of the Green Revolution in the mid-1960s? BI contend that the differences in agricultural performance (and in education and health investments and outcomes) can be attributed to differences in the political environment and a possible failure of collective action in the landlord areas or states (chiefly, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Rajasthan and West Bengal) as compared to the non-landlord states (chiefly, Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat, Karnataka, Maharashtra, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh). Thus, according to BI:
the masses in the landlord areas, with their memories of an oppressive and often absentee landlord class, may perceive their interests as being opposed to that of the local elite, while those in the nonlandlord areas may be more interested in working with that elite (BI, p.1210).
While BI do not provide a direct test of this explanation of differences in the political environment and collective action prospects between landlord and non-landlord districts in this paper (but see Banerjee, Iyer and Somanathan, 2005) , they provide some suggestive evidence in support of their argument. First, they show that landlord states had a higher degree of land inequality (which led the landlord states to enact more land reform legislation post-independence, which may have hampered growth). Second, they show that landlord states had lower per capita levels of state development expenditures in the post-1965 period as compared to non-landlord states.
While it is not clear how, for example, differences in development expenditures across states can in themselves explain agricultural investments and productivity differences between districts, especially when trends in state development expenditures may be picking up unobserved state-specific trends in omitted variables, we do not, in this paper, explicitly test for the suggestive causal mechanisms responsible for BIs findings. This is in part due to the fact that we find their results to be fragile and in part because we think the causal mechanisms behind differential agricultural development in India deserve separate attention and scrutiny. The acquisition of the so-called 'Diwani (revenue collection rights)' by the East India Company in 1863 was followed by a period of overzealous taxation. By the time of the Permanent (zamindari) settlement in 1793, land revenue had almost doubled (Chaudhuri 1983 ). In the settlement, the landed aristocracy, which mainly comprised of the heads of large feudal estates, were declared the proprietors of the soil and their dues to the state fixed 'in perpetuity' (Chaudhuri 1983, p.88) . 10 According to Fuller (1922, p.32) 'the settlement conferred the hereditary rights of property over areas sometimes larger than English counties and left the immediate cultivators mere tenants at will'. The perceived harshness of this settlement, especially towards tenants and small cultivators, has subsequently been held responsible for the concentration of poverty and ill-being in Eastern India.
Further, and remarked upon by BI, and in stark contrast to subsequent settlements, no cadastral survey was undertaken. This absence of detailed land mapping, the vesting of proprietary rights in large landlords, and the complete failure to protect the raiyats or tenants, are the main distinguishing attributes of the Permanent (zamindari) settlement. 11 In a setting already characterised by a strong concentration of control over land resources, the settlement is thus seen to have cemented the pre-existing feudal structure. When seen from this angle, it is easy to perceive the merit of and be sympathetic to BI's main hypothesis.
The Central Provinces: an introduction
The erstwhile Central Provinces (CP) include districts currently in Madhya Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and Orissa, and were formally established in 1861-62, but had come under British control during the previous four to five decades (see below). The legend to Figure 1 and the above text makes clear that most Central Provinces districts were classified by BI as 'landlord'. While the source of Figure 1 is not reported, it resembles a map from a BI (2001) working paper, which in turn closely resembles a map from Baden-Powell's popular version (1894) of his influential Land-Systems of British India (1892), a source apparently relied extensively upon by BI. In the detailed BP map (BP, 1892, Volume 1, reproduced in the Appendix as Figure A2 and digitised here as Figure 2 ), the Central and NW provinces are classified as belonging to the mahalwari (village) revenue system. Thus, Figure 1 runs counter not only to the thrust of BP's maps, which portray the 'chief features of the development of (our) revenue systems' (p.373) but also to the text of BP's three-volume text, where the Central Provinces and the malguzari settlement adopted from the early 1860s onwards feature in the volume covering the mahalwari (village) systems. 13 The historian Tirthankar Roy (2011b: pp.10-11) dismisses BI's coding of the Central Provinces malguzari system as landlord as 'a misclassification'. The next section looks more closely at the history of revenue administration in CP.
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As noted above (see footnote 5), we have reproduced these maps as Figures A1 and A2 in the Appendix. Appendix Figure A1 exactly reproduces the map in BI, 2001. It lacks most of the legend, the part of which that is visible is almost identical to that of the BP 1894 map, which has the full legend. The title and sub-titles of the 1892 and 1894 maps are identical; the main differences lie in the presence of a graticule and district and Province boundaries and names in the former. A full version of the underlying (1894) map ( Figure A1 ) is in Baden-Powell, 1894, downloadable from http://archive.org/details/shortaccountofla00bade. 13 See also Figure A5 in Online Appendix for an extract from BP, which describes the various land revenue systems in colonial India. A succinct summary of Baden-Powell's views can be found on pages 148-149 of Baden-Powell, 1894.
Central Provinces: revenue collection history
The formal establishment of the Central Provinces (CP) involved, as the authoritative revenue administrator J. B. Fuller put it, 'the piecing together of a veritable territorial puzzle (cited in Baden-Powell 1892, p.369)'. While most districts were under Maratha revenue administration prior to the first British takeover in 1818, the regimes preceding Maratha rules were Gond kingdoms in some districts, Mohamedan kings in others and Hindu Rajput kingdoms in yet others. The CP districts can be divided into the Sagar Narbada territories, including Nimar, the Nagpur districts, Chhattisgarh and Sambalpur. A district map of the Central Provinces that includes the time of British acquisition is presented in Online Appendix Figure A3 .
For the Sagar/Narbada territories, the conquest in 1818 marked the beginning of a period of sustained British rule, while for districts in Nagpur and Chhattisgarh, an initial and brief period of direct British rule, from 1818-1830, was followed by an interim of native rule between 1830 and the death of the heirless Raja of Nagpur in 1853, returning these districts to British rule through the so-called doctrine of 'lapse'.
The early settlements varied across districts, were short-term and often involved considerable initial experimentation. A consensus among historians would be that initial revenue demands, and thus taxation burdens, often were unprecedented, overzealous and unsustainable. In the mid 1830s, the Sagar/Narbada territories were administratively appended to the North-West Provinces and strongly influenced by events and revenue debates there: local officers were often, therefore, recruited from N-W P districts (Fuller 1922, p. 30) . In Nimar, the intermediate period khalsa system was based 'on the model of the Bombay 'Ryotwar' system and officials acquainted with the ryotwar system were procured from Bombay to assist (Forsyth, 1870: p.5 ). Meanwhile, the Nagpur province system during the intermediate period with native rule has been described both as 'lax' and as resembling the village system (Fuller 1922, p.41 Figure A5 in Online Appendix), 'the 'Malguzari' Settlement, therefore, presents this feature -that we have here a system of landlords, with tenants over a large proportion of whom they have no power of enhancement or interference.'
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14 Notice that the Central Provinces also included large feudal or semi-feudal estates typically located in forest and/or marginal lands that often were remnants of former Gond and other Kingdoms: these were treated separately and are described as Zamindari estates in CP district revenue settlement reports. This illustrates the endogenous placement of land revenue systems in Central Provinces districts with low productivity and remoteness correlating with Zamindari status. 15 The timing of the start and completion of these surveys varies: in some districts they were completed by 1870; in others start and completion were delayed to the late 1880s/early 1890s. 16 Jabalpur, Narsinghpur and Hoshangabad districts. 17 The extension of Act X of 1859 to the Central Provinces in March 1864 was an important step towards extensive occupancy rights (Fuller 1922: p.47 ). In the Chhattisgarh tract (Raipur and Bilaspur districts) traditional shifting cultivation posed an additional challenge that made special provisions necessary to protect tenants (Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of Raipur District). 18 To convey an impression of what this meant in practice, we cite Raghavan (1985, p.171) : 'The malik makbuza paid revenue to the government but no rent to the malguzar: The right of absolute occupancy was conferred at the time of the first settlement (1860s) to selected tenants and could not be acquired later. This right was hereditary, transferable This is synthesised by Fagan (1932, p.280 ):
In the newly constituted Central Provinces most of the villages were of the ryotwari type. Under the oppressive rule of the Marathas very many of them had been farmed, commonly to their own headmen, who were termed patels. Over groups of others various classes of persons, local tribal chiefs or their relatives, grantees of state revenue, and others, had acquired a proprietary status on quasi-feudal conditions as jagirdar or talukdar. Prior to 1861 summary settlements of various kinds had been made. It was decided at the regular settlement, which began in 1863 and was completed in 1870, to recognise all the above classes as proprietors, under the common designation of malguzar, or revenue-payer, and to make the settlement with them. This arrangement, however, in strong contrast to the Bengal system, was combined with an ample measure of tenant-right, by which a large majority of tenants received substantial protection. This form of settlement was known as malguzari.
Thus, the Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of the Damoh district stated:
it was now decided to recognize the malguzari-status as including the proprietorship of the village and proceedings for the conferrer of proprietory rights formed the most important part of the settlement operations. Malguzars were converted to landlords with the ryots as pure tenants, but the exercise of landlords' powers were substantially limited by the grant of special protection to a large proportion of the ryots (Report on the Land Revenue Settlement of Damoh District, 1893, p.24, emphasis added).
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In almost all the Central Province districts, substantive shares of the land were in the hands of raiyats, whose occupancy status were formally recognised.
Strikingly, in spite of clear historical evidence that suggests otherwise, and with the exception of Sambalpur and to a lesser extent Bhalagat and Narsinghpur, BI classify the 19 districts in their sample drawn from Central Provinces as wholly landlord (and thus assign a value of zero in their p_nland measure of land revenue systems, effectively equating the land revenue system of the Central Provinces with the Permanent (zamindari) settlements of Bengal and Bihar, which are also coded as zero in their p_nland measure). This is not only at odds with Baden-Powell (1892) and other accounts referred to above but also with Raghavan's (1985) more nuanced reading (see footnote 18) that underscores the limited power of the malguzars over the three classes of protected tenants, namely, those with malik makbuza, absolute occupancy or occupancy rights. In compelling contrast to Bengal and Bihar in the 1890s, the protected tenants of the Central Provinces of the 1860s and onwards cannot be credibly represented as 'tenants-atwill' cultivators in a landlord-based revenue system. We address this issue next.
The recoding of the Central Provinces districts
The problem for Banerjee and Iyer's analysis and arguments is that, while they test the robustness of their results by running regressions omitting the uncontested zamindari arrangements of Bengal and Bihar, and report robustness to these omissions, they do not consider how the softer, much later and presumably 'wiser' settlements of the Central Provinces affect their results.
Our discussion of the malguzari settlement suggests that it approximated neither a wholly landlord system (as in BI) nor a wholly non-landlord system (by a naïve inversion of the classification of BI, we term this, and ensured fixity of rent for the term of the settlement. The occupancy tenant was entitled to cultivate his plot at a rent to be fixed by a revenue officer and not the landlord'. 19 Report on the land revenue settlement of the Damoh District in the Central Provinces: effected during the years 1888 to 1891. Nagpur : Printed at Secretariat Press, 1893
with perhaps some historical injustice, the 'Baden-Powell (BP) interpretation'); rather, it was closer to a mixed landlord/non-landlord system, where the pure malguzari components of the land areas in each CP district could be regarded as approximating a de facto zamindari settlement, given the clearly defined hereditary rights of the village headmen and that they were acting as intermediaries in revenue collection for the British. Thus, a more accurate classification of the land revenue system in the Central Provinces would need to take into account that almost all districts in CP had some land under a de facto landlord system and some land under a non-landlord system. In other areas, tenants were clearly awarded some security of tenure. To obtain the proportion of non-landlord area in each Central Provinces district, we add up the land areas over which tenants have malik makbuza, absolute occupancy and occupancy rights, and take the proportion of non-landlord land in a district to be the sum of these land areas as a share of the total (khalsa) land held by malguzars and tenants (see footnote 14).
In Table 1 , we report our revised statistics of the proportions of non-landlord area (which we term p_nland_alt) in each Central Provinces district. All data used in the calculation of p_nland_alt are extracted either from the original Land Revenue Settlement Reports for each district, or from the District Gazetteers, which were obtained through archival search and the reference point (with two exceptions) is the beginning of the 30-year malguzari settlement (1865-69) (see Table 1 for sources of the data).
To see how sensitive the BI results are to the coding of the land revenue system as a landlord settlement, we proceed in three steps . Firstly, we use what we termed the 'Baden-Powell interpretation' of the Central Province districts as mahalwari (Baden-Powell, 1894, p.149) , and recode the land revenue system in the CP districts as wholly non-landlord (that is, p_nland takes the value of one for all former CP districts). This could be taken as the polar opposite of the BI land revenue classification for the CP districts. Secondly, we re-estimate BI's model by including our revised continuous variable of p_nland (p_nland_alt), as reported in Table 1 , where we allowifor the possibility that parts of the land areas in the Central Provinces districts are under de facto landlord control. Finally, we drop the Central Provinces districts to see how sensitive BI's results are to their inclusion, given our argument that BI's classification of the CP districts as wholly landlord is inaccurate. This tests whether there is any zamindari effect, including only those areas the classification of which is not disputed. We also repeat the BI robustness test using an instrumental variable strategy with our preferred coding of the p_nland variable in CP districts (as in Table 1 ). We now move to a reexamination of the BI findings in the next section.
Re-examining the Banerjee-Iyer findings
In this section, we re-examine BI's main findings relating to agricultural development, using the re-codings of the land revenue variables (both the continuous variable and the dummy variable) used by BI for the districts in the erstwhile Central Provinces, as described in the previous section. We begin with the plot of the differences in agricultural investments and yields between landlord and non-landlord districts presented in BI as Figure 5 (p.1207) . We use the same BI data-set for this plot and for the rest of the replication exercises.
20 In Figure 3 , we present the original BI plots of the annual averages for landlord and nonlandlord districts of proportion of irrigated area, fertiliser usage and mean log yield, using the original BI land revenue classification in panels A, B and C, and the same variables, using the Baden-Powell recoded land revenue classification, in Panels D, E and F. 21 BI find that the gaps in the proportion of gross cropped area, fertiliser usage and mean log yield widen between landlord and non-landlord districts after 1965. This is evident from Panels A, B and C of Figure 3 . However, when we use the Baden-Powell interpretation of the land revenue classification for Central Provinces (that is, all Central Province districts are taken as wholly non-landlord), there is no widening of the gap in proportion of irrigated area and mean log yields between landlord and non-landlord districts after 1965, though a widening continues to be observed for fertiliser usage.
BI provide a more systematic analysis of the relationship between colonial land revenue systems and postindependence agricultural investment and productivity differentials between districts using multivariate statistical methods. We turn to this next. BI estimate regressions of the form:
Where Y it is the outcome variable of interest (investment or productivity) in district i and year t, α t is a year fixed effect, NL i is the historical measure of non-landlord control in district i, and X it are the other control variables (see below). The coefficient of interest is β, which captures the impact of the proportion of a district under a non-landlord land revenue system in the post-independence period (or a dichotomous variable representing the predominance of a non-landlord settlement in the district) on the 20 This data-set is a STATA data file named yld_sett_aug03.dta, which is available on the website of the American Economic Review, with the appropriate README file. We have found some errors in this data set, but have not corrected for them in order to maintain as much consistency with the BI data set as possible. 21 BI also present plots of 10 landlord and non-landlord districts in Tamil Nadu from the colonial period onwards. However, we are unable to replicate this figure, as the original data are not provided by BI in the online AER data repository, no specific references are given for them by BI, and we have not found them readily available from the archives. Note: adjusted p_nland is equal to BI pn_land, except for Central Province districts, where p_nland=1 outcome variable of interest. In all of BI's regressions and in our replications of the BI regressions, 22 geographical variables (latitude, altitude, soil type, mean annual rainfall, and a dummy for whether the district is on the coast or not) and the length of time under British rule, are controlled for. In their regressions and in all our replications, the standard errors of the regressions are adjusted for within-district correlation.
BI first estimate equation (1) using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), using the proportion of a district that is under non-landlord control (the continuous variable p_nland) and present the OLS results in col. (1) of Table 3 of their paper. We begin our re-examination of BI's findings by replicating their OLS results, using our .do files and their STATA data. 23 These results are presented in col. (1) of Table 2 .
The coefficient on the non-landlord proportion is positive and statistically significant at 10 percent or lower for all the outcome variables. The results show that non-landlord districts have a 24 percent higher proportion of irrigated area, a 43 percent higher level of fertiliser use, a 27 percent higher proportion of rice area and 27 percent more wheat area under high-yielding seed varieties. Overall, agricultural yields are 16 percent higher, rice yields 17 percent higher and wheat yields are 23 percent higher in non-landlord districts. As noted above, BI also check whether their results are robust to replacing the continuous measure with a binary landlord-non-landlord classification. 24 It is clear from col. (2) of Table 2 , that their results are relatively robust to this alternate specification of the land revenue variable.
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We now re-run the BI regressions following the same structure as in Table 2 . We use identical STATA code and the identical STATA data file used in Table 2 here (with the same specifications, the same periodisation, and the same set of control variables). The only difference between the BI and our regressions is that we use our recoding of the land revenue system in the Central Provinces districts presented in Table 1 . We also present results using the 'Baden-Powell interpretation', and omitting the CP districts. Our results are given in Table 3 .
The differences between BI and our results in Table 3 are striking. Re-estimating equation (1) using the Baden-Powell interpretation of the land revenue system in CP, we find that six of the eight coefficients are not significant, and the remaining two (proportion of gross cropped area irrigated, and log yield of 15 major crops) are negative and significant at five percent and one percent, respectively (col. (1) of Table 3 ). When we use our revised continuous land revenue measure (col. (2) of Table 3 ), we find that only two of the eight coefficients, those of fertiliser and log wheat yields, are positive and significant (five percent), and the rest of the coefficients are statistically insignificant. 
YES YES YES
Notes: BI sample; Standard errors in parentheses, corrected for district-level clustering. *Significant at 10 percent level; ** Significant at five percent level; *** Significant at one percent level. Each cell represents the coefficient from a regression of the dependent variable on the measure of non-landlord control -in column (1) the Baden-Powell dummy, and in columns (2) and (3) the continuous p_nland variable. Column 2 includes the Central Provinces districts taking the values reported in Table 1 . The non-landlord share is the share of total 'khalsa' land, where tenants have malik makbuza, absolute occupancy or occupancy rights. The total 'khalsa' land comprises, in addition, and mainly of sir (or the homeland of the malguzar) land and the land cultivated by 'tenants at will', who had no occupancy rights or entitlements in the land and thus effectively were controlled by the malguzars. Data are from 1956 to 1982 for irrigation, 156-1987 for productivity, and 1965-1987 for HYVs. Geographic controls are altitude, latitude, mean annual rainfall, and dummies for soil type and coastal regions.
The differences from the BI results with the revision and re-coding of the Central Provinces districts to be under non-landlord revenue control is remarkable, as only 21 of the 166 districts used in BI's empirical analysis are recoded; this represents a mere 13 percent of the total sample of districts. Finally, we reestimate equation (1) without the Central Provinces districts (col. (3) of Table 3 ), and find that the coefficient on non-landlord proportion is not statistically significant, and in some cases, negative, for the various measures of agricultural development. This provides clear and substantial evidence that the coding by BI of the Central Province districts as a landlord land revenue system is driving BI's main results.
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BI undertake two further robustness tests -first, they try and control for possible omitted variables around unobserved district characteristics by using an extremely restricted sample, in which they consider only those districts that happen to be geographical neighbours (that is, share common borders) and second, they estimate equation (1) using instrumental variable (IV) methods, to address the possible endogeneity of British placement of land revenue systems to more productive districts, and possible measurement errors in their land revenue measure (these results feature in Table 4 of their paper). The first of these tests is unconvincing, because the clusters of districts with common boundaries are rather artificial. Thus, in the Andhra Pradesh cluster, only one of the two landlord districts has a common border with the non-landlord district. 27 Further, BI compare 10 non-landlord (mahalwari) with eight landlord (taluqdari) districts in presentday Uttar Pradesh; five of these 18 districts can be seen as mis-classified if we use the BI p_nland cut-off for a district being classified as a landlord district, which is set at p_nland = 0.4; in the case of the geographical cluster of Western UP, only one of the nine districts can be legitimately classified as nonlandlord, calling into question the validity of this robustness test (see online appendix Table A2 , and its notes for more details).
28
We instead replicate the instrumental variable estimate of BI to see whether our results using OLS remain valid when using IV estimation methods. We first present the BI results using their instrumental variable strategy (col. (1) of Table 4 ), where they use a dummy variable that takes the value of one if the date that the district came under British land revenue control was between 1820 and 1856, as the instrument for their non-landlord land revenue proportion variable. 29 Their coefficient on the non-landlord proportion using IV methods remains positive and statistically significant for several of the agricultural outcome variables. Specifically, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant for fertiliser use, proportion of wheat and other cereal areas under HYV seeds, log rice yield, and log wheat yield. We now re-run the IV estimates using our recoded non-landlord proportion variable, p_nland_alt. 30 We find that the coefficient on p_nland_alt is negative and statistically insignificant for proportion of gross cropped area irrigated, fertiliser use, log yield of major crops, and log wheat yield (col. (2) of Table 4 ). The coefficient is positive but statistically significant for the IV estimate only for the proportion of other cereal area under HYV. Our instrumental variable estimates support our earlier OLS results that the positive and significant relationship that BI find between non-landlord revenue control and agricultural performance is due to their coding of the Central Provinces as landlord, and, using a more accurate classsification of the land revenue system in this region from original land revenue settlement records, we again find that the BI results no longer hold.
31
Thus, we find that with what we consider to be the more historically accurate classification of colonial land revenue system prevailing in Indian districts, and the recoding of the non-landlord proportion variable to reflect this classification, there is a dramatic over-turning of BI's key findings on post-independence agricultural development in India.
Conclusions
A large and influential literature argues that institutions are the fundamental cause of long-run economic progress. BI's seminal contribution to this literature was to identify the role of, in particular, more 'oppressive' colonial land revenue systems in explaining widely differing agricultural development across districts in India in the post-independence era and especially after 1965, when the Green Revolution brought about significant increases in agricultural investments and output in some regions of the country, but not in others. BI purport to show that property rights institutions that were the product of colonial times mattered for comparative economic development within India, and that areas where proprietary rights were historically given to landlords performed far worse than areas where proprietary rights were allocated to village bodies or individual cultivators.
In this paper, we re-examine the empirical basis of the key proposition put forward by BI that there is a causal role of landlord-based land revenue systems on lack of agricultural development in postindependence India, especially after 1965. We argue that the classification of the Central Provinces as a landlord revenue system is mistaken, since reliable historical evidence suggests that the malguzari settlement of the Central Provinces implemented in the 1860s was accompanied by cadastral surveys and extensive protection of tenants, and is interpreted both in the colonial literature and by modern historians to more closely resemble a village-based or a mixed landlord/non-landlord land revenue system. Drawing on historical texts and original land revenue settlement records, we re-estimate from historical records, and re- 30 The only difference between our IV strategy and that of BI is that we use as an instrument a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the date of British revenue control is between 1813 and 1856, while BI's instrument takes the value one if a district came under British rule after 1820, when, according to BI, the proponents of the raiyatwari became dominant as reflected in the adoption of MacKenzie's famous minute (dated 1 July 1819, passed into law in 1822). However, historical records suggest that the raiyatwari system became the preferred system much before 1823, and closer to 1813. Indeed, the whole subject came to be looked at from a new point of view between 1807 and 1820, not only as a consequence of the inquiries made in the North-Western Provinces, but of the general interest in the subject excited by the strong 'Raiyatwari' minutes of Sir T. Munro in Madras, and his visit home and conferences with the Directors in 1807 (Baden-Powell 1892; 17)'. Thus, we use the earlier date to construct our instrument. Substantively this changes the value of the instrument for the districts that were conquered between 1813 and 1818 and which are predominantly in Bombay Presidency, Berar and the subsequent Central Provinces (of the 30 districts affected by this reclassification, 14 are in present-day Madhya Pradesh, and 10 in Maharashtra). 31 In the Online Appendix ( Figure A4 and Table A1 ), we provide further justification of our instrumental variable, as well as present the first-stage regression results for BI and our specifications.
code the key explanatory variables used by BI in their empirical analysis for the districts which were in the former Central Provinces to reflect what we consider to be a more accurate classification of colonial land revenue systems. Using the new measures of land revenue systems, we re-run the regression specifications used by the BI and find dramatic over-turning of their key results. A similar overturning occurs if we drop the Central Provinces districts. We show that, contrary to expectations, it is the Central Provinces and not the harsh Permanent (zamindari) settlements of Eastern India that are responsible for BI's results. Hence, we argue that BI's argument that colonial land revenue systems mattered for post-independent agricultural development in India rests on fragile historical and statistical foundations. Plotting the kernel regressions of our recoded non-landlord proportion and the mean log agricultural yield against the data of conquest and comparing the plot to that of a similar kernel regression of BI's nonlandlord proportion and the mean log agricultural yield against date of conquest in Figure 4 (Panel A of this figure corresponds to Figure 4 , p. 1206, of BI's paper), we find that there is a good fit in the shapes of the two lines in both our case and in BI's. Thus, in our case, a dummy with the date of conquest from 1813 to 1856 serves as a good instrument of non-landlord revenue control. We present the first stage regressions of the IV strategy as in BI and with our recoded non-landlord revenue control proportion variable in Panels A and B of Table A1 . The table suggests that the coefficient on the instrument is positive and statistically significant for both BI and in our case, underscoring the validity of the dummy for British conquest, 1820-1856 in BI and 1813-1856 in our case, as an instrument for non-landlord proportion. Table 4 Panel B in that here we report the actual first stage regressions (from STATA ivreg) for the three periodisations used -for irrigation growth 1956 -1982 for % area under HYV 1965 for % area under HYV -1987 and 1956 -1987 for log yields. Table 5 , for a list of the neighbouring districts used in their analysis, along with the geographical cluster and their landlord/non-landlord classification. BI state in their paper that that they use the cut-off value of pn_land=0.4 and above to classify districts as nonlandlord, except if the district is in Oudh province, in which case it is classified as landlord, regardless of the value of p_nland (see footnote 21 of their paper, and page 1202). Using the BI cut-off, the number of inconsistent landlord/non-landlord classifications among these 18 districts would be five (marked by the letter M). In the case of Uttar Pradesh West, only one district remains as non-landlord, while eight are landlord, rendering the comparision between landlord and non-landlord districts in the same geographical cluster meaningless. (zam, mah, mal, rai) that are predominantly zamindari, raiyatwari, mahalwari or malguzari (Taluqdari classified with Zamindari), respectively (equivalent to intercepts for the different systems). X is the set of (geographic, year and time since annexation) controls as in all the BI specifications), and δ t are year fixed effects. If a settlement system had consistent adverse effects, we would expect smaller intercepts for this type. We also tested a version of equation (A1) with slopes and another without the intercepts for the different land revenue types, and with a five way classification -subdividing the landlord districts into permanent settlement (zamindari) and taluqdari; results are available from the authors. 
Data Sources used by BI

